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Abstract
Numerous studies document that better-looking candidates win more votes. Yet the 
causal mechanisms leading to this advantage remain unexplored. We consider for 
the first time a potential trigger of the looks–vote association that has previously 
been suggested but not tested in the literature: exposure to campaign posters of the 
candidates. We test this explanation with German election survey data, which we 
augment with ratings—provided by MTurk workers from the U.S.—of the attrac-
tiveness and facial competence of about 1,000 district candidates. Confirming pre-
vious studies on Germany, we find that attractiveness is positively associated with 
candidate vote share (1.2 ppts. min–max). At the voter level, we find tentative evi-
dence for the idea that the association is moderated by exposure to campaign post-
ers: effects are in the expected directions and their sizes consistent with what we 
observe at the candidate level, but we cannot always reject the null hypothesis of no 
effect. In contrast to attractiveness, we do not find conclusive evidence for an effect 
of facial competence in the election considered. These preliminary results suggest 
that inundating voters with candidate posters, as in elections in Germany and many 
other places, might be a reason for voting based on looks.
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Introduction
Appearance matters in elections. A plethora of studies now suggests that candi-
dates who look more attractive, competent, or otherwise appealing win more votes. 
Observational evidence from numerous countries1 points to an association between 
looks and votes, even after controlling for various alternative explanations (Laust-
sen 2014; Lenz and Lawson 2011). Further experimental research established the 
possibility of looks to actually exert a causal influence on vote choice (Ahler et al. 
2017; Budesheim and DePaola 1994). Together, these findings raise concerns about 
voters’ abilities to make informed choices in democratic elections. In particular, 
while we know that voters often find themselves ill-equipped to make fully informed 
choices and that, instead, they rely on cues such as a candidate’s party affiliation 
in order to reach a heuristic decision (Popkin 1991), the validity of such decisions 
arguably depends on how informative the employed cues are (Dancey and Sheagley 
2013; Lau and Redlawsk 2001). Party affiliation, for example, might serve as a valid 
cue for inferring a candidate’s political stances in contexts where parties are cohe-
sive and do not alter their platforms greatly from one election to the next. However, 
whether the looks of a candidate provide a basis for inferring his or her political 
stances, or any other politically relevant qualities, is much less clear (Herrmann and 
Shikano 2016; Todorov et al. 2015).
Given this potentially worrying state of affairs, scholars are increasingly turning 
to the deeper question of what causes the observed association between looks and 
votes. Some argue that good-looking candidates enjoy an advantage in their rela-
tions with the media (e.g., Waismel-Manor and Tsfati 2011). In this account vot-
ers are not ultimately responsible as they do not choose candidates based on looks, 
but rather based on information skewed in favor of good-looking candidates. Other 
accounts see voters as the main causal driver (e.g., Ahler et al. 2017). As we argue 
below, these are important unresolved questions in research on the appearance effect 
in elections.
To address these questions, we need to pay closer attention to the real-world pro-
cesses leading to an effect of candidate appearance in an election (either through 
voters or the media). In some contexts the causal mechanism may seem obvious, as, 
for example, when ballot papers show photographs of the candidates (Banducci et al. 
2008; Buckley et al. 2007). Yet, in many other contexts for which appearance effects 
have been reported (among them U.S. congressional elections), no similarly obvious 
causal mechanism comes to mind. To truly understand the nature of the problem, 
who is responsible for it, and how to accommodate it, we must learn more about the 
mechanisms that give rise to an effect of candidate appearance in elections.
We contribute to this emerging field by testing, for the first time, whether the 
appearance effect originates with voters—in particular, whether exposure to cam-
paign posters of candidates triggers voting based on looks. Our test case is German 
1 Among them Australia, Brazil, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, Switzer-
land, the UK, and the USA; for a review, see Olivola and Todorov (2010); in addition, see Laustsen 
(2014) and Lutz (2010).
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federal elections. Voters in these elections typically know very little about the candi-
dates in their local district, which provides an opportunity for candidate appearance 
to affect vote choices. While ballot papers in German elections do not show pictures 
of the candidates, campaign posters are widely used by candidates and widespread 
in the weeks before an election. Previous studies document an association between 
the appearance and the vote share of district candidates in German parliamentary 
elections (Jäckle and Metz 2017; Klein and Rosar 2005; Rosar et  al. 2008) and 
they propose candidate posters as a potential explanation for the observed associa-
tion (Klein and Rosar 2005; Rosar et al. 2008). We use survey data from the 2009 
election, which we augment with measures of district candidates’ attractiveness and 
facial competence, to test this explanation. Our results indicate that attractiveness 
is related to vote choice among candidates that voters report having seen on posters 
and unrelated to vote choice among candidates that voters report not having seen.
Our findings also contribute to the cumulative body of work that estimates the 
size of the appearance effect in elections (see note 1). While confirming an effect of 
candidate attractiveness in German parliamentary elections, our estimate of the size 
of the effect turns out to be substantially smaller than previous ones. From a meta-
analytic perspective, this suggests that the appearance effect may be more variable, 
and perhaps smaller, on average, than previously assumed.
Sources of an appearance effect in elections
Given abundant evidence for an effect of candidate appearance in democratic elec-
tions across the globe, more and more scholars are now turning to the deeper ques-
tion of how such an effect comes about. The extant literature suggests two main 
explanations for the creation of an appearance effect: one in which candidate looks 
affect voters directly; and another in which good-looking candidates enjoy an advan-
tage in their relations with the media, such that voters ultimately receive more, as 
well as more favorable information about them. We discuss both explanations in 
turn.
The first explanation starts from the assumption that candidate looks exert a direct 
influence on voting decisions. In this account voters judge candidates based on their 
facial appearance. A large literature in cognitive psychology shows that humans 
have a strong tendency for making social attributions from faces (for a review, see 
Todorov et al. 2015). These spontaneous judgments occur automatically and uncon-
trollably, within milliseconds of exposure. They are akin to what dual-process theo-
ries in psychology describe as automatic system 1 processing (Evans and Stanovich 
2013), or fast thinking (Kahneman 2011), a mode of information processing that 
is effortless, intuitive, and typically prior to more attentive, reflective, and effort-
ful system 2 processing. Due to their rapid and automatic nature, impressions from 
faces may serve as a cognitive shortcut, allowing the voter to avoid effortful system 
2 processing, or they may anchor subsequent, more deliberate thinking (Todorov 
et al. 2005).
Perhaps the most likely scenario for such a direct effect of looks is when vot-
ers are exposed to images of the candidates in the voting booth. Scholars have 
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long stressed the importance of ballot paper photographs and other voting aids2 
in triggering appearance effects (Banducci et al. 2008; Buckley et al. 2007; Johns 
and Shephard 2011; Leigh and Susilo 2009) and evidence from these studies sug-
gests that candidate appearance correlates strongly with votes in elections that pre-
sent voters with candidate pictures on the ballot. A related possibility for candidate 
appearance to directly affect voters is via canvassing efforts. Studies often suggest 
campaign posters in the streets and on billboards, as well as leaflets, mail advertis-
ing, and newspaper ads by candidates as potential sources of an appearance effect 
(see, e.g., Klein and Rosar 2005; Lawson et al. 2010; Stockemer and Praino 2015). 
In Switzerland, for example, where voters are allowed to cast substantial numbers 
of preferential votes within and across party lists, voters regularly get leaflets from 
all the parties sent to their homes showing the candidates who are up for election 
in their Canton (Lutz 2010). Similarly, parties in Australia hand how-to-vote cards 
with candidate pictures on them to voters entering the polling place (King and Leigh 
2009). Given the possibility of voters choosing candidates based on looks (Ahler 
et al. 2017), canvassing might trigger such decisions in elections in which voters are 
not exposed to candidate images in the voting booth. So far, empirical tests of such a 
link have been scant.
The second suggested explanation for the looks–vote association is more sub-
tle. In this account looks exert an indirect influence on election results by shaping 
how politicians are treated by the media (e.g., Maurer and Schoen 2010; Tsfati et al. 
2010; Waismel-Manor and Tsfati 2011). If the media treat good-looking politicians 
more favorably, voters who follow the news more frequently will be exposed to more 
favorable information about those candidates and this might affect their preferences 
toward them. Importantly, voters in this account do not (need to) choose candidates 
based on looks. The looks–vote association comes about because candidate appear-
ance affects what information voters receive about the candidates.
One argument for such a mechanism is that reporters might prefer to cover good-
looking politicians, believing it will draw greater attention to their stories. This could 
be the case in televised reporting, but it may also extend to the print media (Maurer and 
Schoen 2010). Another argument is that reporters might be more inclined to speak to 
good-looking politicians, expecting them to be more charismatic and communicative 
interview partners. In turn, greater self-esteem and confidence might make good-look-
ing politicians more motivated to seek news coverage (see Waismel-Manor and Tsfati 
2011 for a more detailed account of these mechanisms). Apart from being selected at 
higher rates, good-looking politicians might also come away more positively in news 
reports if reporters are subject to psychological biases. In particular, a large literature 
demonstrates a tendency in humans to judge good-looking individuals more favorably 
on other unknown traits. This so-called ‘halo effect’ is particularly well documented for 
physically attractive individuals (Eagly et al. 1991)—who are perceived, among other 
things, as more confident, sociable, and intelligent—and it extends to judgments of pol-
iticians (Herrmann and Shikano 2016; Surawski and Ossoff 2006).
2 For example, voting machines in many developing countries show pictures of the candidates as an aid 
for illiterate voters (Lawson et al. 2010; Moehler and Conroy-Krutz 2016).
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Empirical evidence for differential media treatment of good-looking politicians 
comes from several studies. Tsfati et al. (2010) show that physically attractive mem-
bers of the Knesset appear more frequently on television, after controlling for a host 
of other influential factors. Waismel-Manor and Tsfati (2011) found the same relation-
ship for U.S. members of Congress. Barrett and Barrington (2005) examine coverage 
of congressional and gubernatorial elections by seven Midwestern newspapers and find 
strong differences in how favorably candidates are portrayed on photographs. Maurer 
and Schoen (2010) examine articles from five local newspapers on 25 candidates at the 
2005 Bundestag election. They find that attractive candidates get more as well as better 
press than unattractive ones. Lastly, one study also probes a link between media expo-
sure and candidate preference. By leveraging tens of thousands of survey responses 
from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study in conjunction with appearance 
ratings of U.S. Senate and gubernatorial candidates, Lenz and Lawson (2011) show 
that the effect of candidate appearance on vote intention is stronger among voters who 
watch more television and know less about politics.
The puzzle
The possibility of media bias represents an important alternative explanation for the 
association between looks and votes. If good looks put candidates at an advantage in 
competition for voter attention, then voters who closely follow the media will poten-
tially learn more about the positions of good-looking candidates and receive more 
favorable information about them. In such a lopsided informational environment, 
voters cannot be blamed for electing such candidates. To understand whether and to 
what extent the effect originates at the level of voters or the media, we need to iso-
late and examine more closely the different routes through which candidate appearance 
might translate into votes. This is not a trivial undertaking. For example, the associa-
tion between TV consumption and voting based on looks reported in Lenz and Lawson 
(2011) is consistent with both a story of voter bias and a story of media bias in which 
less knowledgeable voters learn more about the views of good-looking candidates 
because they appear more frequently or favorably on television.
Our contribution below is to provide the first test of whether the appearance effect 
originates with voters. To this end we look at exposure to campaign posters, a mecha-
nism that is often cited in the literature as a potential trigger of appearance effects (e.g., 
Lenz and Lawson 2011; Stockemer and Praino 2015). We examine a case in which the 
use of candidate posters is very widespread, making them a likely explanation for the 
vote-looks association. Should we find an effect of posters in this context, it would lend 
support to the idea that voters are influenced by candidate looks.
Test case and observable implications
We consider the effect of candidate appearance in district contests at German 
Bundestag elections. These contests are single-winner elections in which the 
seat is awarded to the candidate with the most votes. The distribution of seats in 
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parliament is determined by the outcome of a second ballot—a party ballot—that 
voters cast independently of the candidate ballot. The outcome of the candidate 
ballot is usually inconsequential for the distribution of seats because district win-
ners merely fill the seats that their party won via the second ballot. Elections in 
Germany are fought primarily by parties and their leaders, and the candidates that 
compete in local districts are not well known (Maier 2000). Most voters cannot 
name a single candidate in their constituency (Schmitt-Beck 1993).
The low-information character of the candidate ballot coupled with its rela-
tively minor importance provides fertile ground for an effect of candidate appear-
ance. Prior research indeed testifies to such an effect at the 2002 Bundestag elec-
tion (Klein and Rosar 2005), the 2005 state election in North Rhine-Westphalia 
(Rosar, Klein and Beckers 2008), and the 2013 Bundestag election (Jäckle and 
Metz 2017).
Regarding potential sources of the appearance effect, by far the best chance for 
voters to get exposed to candidate looks is through campaign posters. According 
to Holtz-Bacha and Lessinger (2006: 122), in Germany “candidate posters are 
a classic among election posters, as they define the image of constituency-level 
advertising” [translation by the authors]. Posters with headshot images of district 
candidates are almost ubiquitous in German elections (Holtz-Bacha and Lessinger 
2017; Rosar et al. 2008). They can be found on nearly every Main Street, even in 
small villages, weeks before the election—see the online Supporting Information 
(SI) for examples.
Candidate posters in Germany are also quite similar in their basic design and 
composition. Besides a headshot of the candidate, a typical poster shows the can-
didate’s name and party affiliation and sometimes includes an indication of MP 
status or a short (party) slogan. Since candidate name, party affiliation, and MP 
status are also provided on ballot papers, the main takeaway from a typical poster 
is the candidate’s face. In other words, holding all else constant, for two voters 
entering the voting booth, one having previously been exposed to posters while 
the other has not, the only systematic difference between them is that the former 
voter has seen some candidates’ faces while the latter has not. This makes expo-
sure to candidate posters a prime explanation for an effect of appearance. Our 
hypothesis, therefore, is that exposure to campaign posters moderates the effect of 
appearance in German elections:
Hypothesis For candidates that the voter has seen on posters, appearance has 
a stronger effect on vote choice than for candidates that the voter has not seen on 
posters.
Apart from posters, prior studies also suggest local newspapers in Germany as 
a potential driver of an appearance effect (Klein and Rosar 2005; Maurer and Sch-
oen 2010). Through local newspapers, voters might get exposed to photographs of 
their local candidates (e.g., in articles or campaign ads). On the other hand, good-
looking candidates may enjoy greater and more positive news coverage for all 
the reasons outlined in the previous section, and voters may be more inclined to 
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choose them on the basis of that information. Rather than being swayed by looks, 
voters in this scenario decide based on information whose provision is influenced 
by candidate appearance.
In light of these arguments, our analysis below controls for whether voters read 
local newspapers. We do not, however, attempt to test the media bias mechanism 
directly. One reason is that we do not know how widespread biased news coverage 
of local candidates actually is in Germany. Given the large number of local daily 
newspapers—over 333 in the year 2009 with an estimated 14 million subscriptions 
(Pasquay 2009)—it would need to be very widespread in order to affect a large num-
ber of voters.3 Moreover, even among voters who read newspapers, biased news cov-
erage will have no effect if voters choose not to read stories about the candidates; 
and if a favorable news story comes up about a candidate and voters actually notice 
it, the story will be gone with next day’s paper, thus limiting exposure time com-
pared to candidate posters. Taken together, even if many news outlets in Germany 
indeed exhibit a bias toward good-looking candidates, and readers of said newspa-
pers are indeed influenced by the more positive news coverage, the sheer number of 
voters to whom this would apply might be too small for the effect to show up in our 
voter-level analysis. By contrast, candidate posters provide a simple and direct way 
for candidate looks to reach voters, as posters are ubiquitous in German elections, 
similar in design, and voters are exposed to them up until the day of the election. 
Thus, if posters exhibit an effect, they potentially affect every voter. Consequently, 
we place greater confidence in our design’s ability to detect an effect of candidate 
posters compared to an effect of news bias.
Lastly, recall that our goal is to understand how the appearance effect comes 
about. In particular, is it caused by voters or the media? Finding a correlation of 
looks and candidate choice among voters who read newspapers would be compatible 
with news bias as well as with voters being directly affected by visual coverage of 
the candidates. It would thus not help us answer the deeper question of what is driv-
ing the effect. While all this does not rule out the possibility of media bias contribut-
ing to the looks–vote association in Germany, we believe a different, more focused 
design would be necessary to uncover its actual impact.
While the prior literature on Germany mainly cites candidate posters and news-
paper bias as potential sources of an appearance effect (see Klein and Rosar 2005; 
Maurer and Schoen 2010; Rosar et  al. 2008), the broader literature discussed in 
the previous section suggests more ways in which an appearance effect might play 
out in an election. One possibility that we can rule out is exposure to ballot paper 
photographs, which are not permitted in German elections. Local candidates also 
do not appear or advertise on television. Such appearances are mostly observed by 
party leaders and other top-level politicians, as TV broadcasters generally cater to a 
national, regional, or state-wide audience. Regarding canvassing, parties in Germany 
3 Note that our above count of 333 local newspapers in 2009 is conservative as many newspapers further 
subdivide their distribution area into smaller parts, providing local supplements with independent edito-
rial departments for each of them. Counting all editorial departments that publish their own newspaper 
issue brings the count of local newspapers up to 1,511 (Pasquay 2009).
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do occasionally send out leaflets and other postal ads. Below, we therefore control 
for whether voters report having received leaflets from a local candidate. We do not 
attempt to test the hypothesis that looks affect voting conditional on having received 
such ads because, as with newspaper readership, the assumed causal chain is more 
fragile, and because our design is not well suited to ascertain whether leaflets indeed 
induce voting based on looks.4
Research design
To study the processes underlying the appearance effect, we follow Lenz and Law-
son (2011) by combining appearance ratings of constituency candidates with voter 
survey data. Our general strategy is, first, to replicate prior findings for Germany at 
the candidate level by testing for an association between looks and electoral results 
at the 2009 Bundestag election. Having established such an association for the elec-
tion in question, we then test our individual-level hypothesis about the effect being 
triggered by candidate posters.
Data collection
We use data from the pre- and post-election surveys (N = 2173 and N = 2115) of the 
2009 German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES).5 Both surveys ask if respond-
ents have seen posters of each of the major party candidates running in their district, 
and whether and how often they read local or other newspapers. Our sample of dis-
trict candidates is comprised of all candidates covered by the pre-election survey 
and consists of 1,040 candidates from 208 of Germany’s 299 districts. The survey 
identifies the candidates of the five major parties (CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, Greens, 
and The Left) in a respondent’s district. Due to random sampling of respondents, 
the survey does not cover all districts. Table S1 in the SI shows that our candidate 
sample is representative of all major party candidates in 2009 with respect to key 
variables.
We obtained headshot photographs of the district candidates from the offi-
cial webpages of the German Bundestag, state parliaments, the candidates’ own 
5 Survey data was obtained from the GESIS archive, the study number is ZA5302.
4 For one thing, leaflets vary more than posters in how much additional information they provide about a 
candidate. This introduces measurement error and makes an effect of looks harder to identify. The effect 
would either have to be very large, or the sample of voters exposed to leaflets would have to be very 
large, or we would need to know more about what else was on the leaflet. Neither of these conditions is 
(likely) satisfied. Furthermore, compared to posters, which are around for weeks and difficult to avoid, 
voters have more control over their exposure to leaflets. This introduces the possibility that appearance 
might not affect vote choice directly. For example, voters might be more likely to keep leaflets of good-
looking candidates and thus be exposed to those candidates’ campaign messages for a longer time. Tell-
ing apart these different causal stories requires a more focused design than the one we employ below.
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webpages, or other repositories to which the candidates submitted photographs.6 All 
selected pictures had to be head-and-shoulder photographs displaying the candidate 
against a flat or neutral background. All images were converted to black and white. 
For a few candidates (mostly from the socialist party The Left), we could not find 
suitable images. The final sample for which we obtained appearance ratings thus 
comprises 1,012 candidates from 208 districts. Two candidates were misclassified in 
the pre-election survey, which brings the number of candidates used in the analysis 
to 1,010.
We collected ratings of physical attractiveness and facial competence of all candi-
dates. Prior studies on the appearance effect in elections have mostly focused on one 
of these two characteristics (e.g., Banducci et al. 2008; King and Leigh 2009; Lenz 
and Lawson 2011; Todorov et al. 2005) or both (e.g., Berggren et al. 2010; Laustsen 
2014; Lutz 2010; Olivola and Todorov 2010; Praino et al. 2014). Most prior work 
on German elections focuses on attractiveness (Klein and Rosar 2005; Maurer and 
Schoen 2010; Rosar et al. 2008) but it seems reasonable to assume that facial com-
petence might also affect voting decisions in Germany (Jäckle and Metz 2017).
We follow earlier work in having photographs judged by raters from another 
country (Antonakis and Dalgas 2009; Berggren et al. 2010; King and Leigh 2009; 
Lawson et  al. 2010; Praino and Stockemer 2019; Praino et  al. 2014; Rule et  al. 
2010; Stockemer and Praino 2017). Specifically, ratings were provided by Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers from the U.S. Ratings by outsiders make for a 
cleaner and unbiased measurement of the desired traits (see Lawson et al. 2010 for 
a discussion). They also allow us to rule out the possibility that raters might, con-
sciously or unconsciously, recognize any of the candidates or that their judgments 
get tainted by stereotypes about German politicians’ appearance (Berggren et  al. 
2010). Unlike student raters, who are well educated and mostly under age 30, work-
ers on MTurk span a much larger age range and include people from different edu-
cational backgrounds (Berinsky et al. 2012; Huff and Tingley 2015). Such diversity 
should make ratings from MTurk workers more representative of views held in the 
general population than those of student raters. A detailed description of the data 
collection process along with statistics on workers and appearance ratings is pro-
vided in the SI.
Each worker rated a batch of 50 pictures, which were presented one at a time and 
in random order.7 The worker rated either the attractiveness or the competence of 
the displayed person, but not both, on a 7-point scale. The payment for this ‘human 
intelligence task’ (HIT) was 1 dollar and the average time to completion was about 
6  min. Each rater was allowed to participate for at most two times: once to pro-
vide attractiveness ratings and once to provide competence ratings for batches of 50 
pictures each. Ratings of attractiveness and competence were collected two months 
6 Note that the webpages of the Bundestag and other assemblies provide us with footage on successful as 
well as many unsuccessful district candidates. This is because most candidates who are unsuccessful in 
the district nevertheless get elected due to their placement on the party list. In other instances, candidates 
who do not win a Bundestag mandate were, or later became, members of state parliaments and other 
lower-level assemblies. Images were collected in spring 2013. For pictures taken after the election.
7 There were a total of 21 batches for each rating task. Two of these batches contained only 31 pictures 
because our sample comprised 1,012 political candidates.
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apart. Hence, no rater provided more than 50 attractiveness and 50 competence rat-
ings, and no rater simultaneously judged both traits for the same candidates.
Each batch of pictures was judged by 28 raters, on average. Reliability of 
attractiveness ratings was very high (Cronbach’s alpha: min = 0.93, max = 0.97, 
mean = 0.95). Competence ratings, by contrast, were less reliable (Cronbach’s alpha: 
min = 0.79, max = 0.95, mean = 0.87; see Table  S4 in the SI). Following standard 
practice, we obtained attractiveness and facial competence scores for each image by 
averaging all its ratings. Overall, the candidates in our sample score higher and vary 
less in facial competence (mean = 4.4, SD = 0.6) than in attractiveness (mean = 3.3, 
SD = 0.8; see Figure S2 and Table S5 in the SI). In line with previous studies (e.g., 
Lutz 2010; Olivola and Todorov 2010), we found attractiveness and facial compe-
tence ratings to be moderately correlated (r = 0.45).
Identifying the effect of candidate looks
Since voters can only choose among the candidates in their respective district, an 
effect of looks implies that better-looking candidates should win more votes rela-
tive to their competitors in the district, and the size of this effect should be propor-
tional to the size of the appearance advantage: if all candidates in the constituency 
are good looking, the effect on vote choice should be small; if one candidate stands 
out from the rest, the effect on vote share should be large (a ’frog pond’ effect; see 
Rosar et al. 2008). Consequently, we choose a statistical approach that identifies the 
effect of looks by comparing only those candidates that a voter actually faces, that 
is: we do not compare candidates from different districts (for similar strategies, see 
Antonakis and Dalgas 2009; Berggren et al. 2010; Lutz 2010; Praino and Stockemer 
2019; Praino et al. 2014; Todorov et al. 2005).
At the level of candidates, we employ linear regression with district fixed effects 
to achieve this. Fixed-effects estimation identifies the effect of candidate appearance 
on vote share by using deviations of both variables from their respective district 
means (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, pp. 702–703, 726).8 Mean differencing erases 
any between-district variation in the overall levels of both variables. In effect, the 
regression coefficients are estimated solely from within-district variation. Thus, the 
better a candidate looks compared to the average in the district, the larger his or her 
share of the vote should be compared to the average in the district. At the level of the 
individual voter, we infer the effect of looks via conditional logit analysis of candi-
date choice. This approach mirrors our identification strategy at the candidate level 
by comparing only those candidates with each other that a voter actually faces, i.e., 
the candidates that compete in his or her district. In doing so, conditional logit also 
8 For two-candidate races, the fixed effects approach is essentially the same as regressing the vote mar-
gin on the difference in candidate attributes (e.g., Antonakis and Dalgas 2009; Praino and Stockemer 
2019; Todorov et al. 2005). For multicandidate elections, Berggren, Jordahl and Poutvaara (2010) use a 
fixed effects approach in order to compare candidates from the same party list in terms of their share of 
preference votes.
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considers only differences in the attributes of alternatives, not their absolute values 
(Train 2009, pp. 19–20).
Control variables
To rule out spurious correlation, we control for a large set of factors that might plau-
sibly influence candidate vote share in German elections (see Herrmann and Tepe 
2018). The first factor is the candidate’s party. At the voter level we control for party 
via standard measures of party preference (i.e., feeling thermometers as well as 
party identification). In the candidate-level analyses, we control for the strength of 
a candidate’s party by including its share of second votes in the district. In addition, 
we include party dummies in both kinds of analyses to account for the fact that some 
parties (in particular the CDU and SPD) tend to win more first votes than second 
votes, while other parties tend to win fewer first votes, and we include one such 
set of party dummies for East Germany and one for West Germany to account for 
known regional differences in split-ticket voting.
Second, we control for candidate strength, in particular seniority and political 
experience, by including incumbency status and MP status. The latter measure also 
covers constituency candidates who previously obtained a seat through their party 
list. We also control for ‘double nominations’ that is, whether a constituency candi-
date also runs on the party list. Lastly, we include a dummy for candidates that are 
well known to the public due to their elevated position in the party or parliamen-
tary hierarchy, in particular cabinet ministers, floor leaders, and party leaders (see 
Table S8 in the SI for their identities).
Third, we control for candidate gender and (log of) age to avoid misattributing 
age and gender differences to candidate appearance, and we include controls for 
other candidate attributes that are known to voters because they get printed on the 
ballot paper.9 These include academic titles, in particular ‘Dr.’ and ‘Prof.’, and can-
didate occupation, which was coded into standard occupational prestige categories 
(Blossfeld et al. 2001).
A breakdown of candidates’ average attractiveness and facial competence scores 
by gender, party, and other characteristics (see Tables S6 and S7 in the SI) reveals 
that appearance is indeed related to these covariates: female candidates are per-
ceived as more attractive and more competent looking, on average; candidates from 
conservative parties (CDU, CSU, and FDP) are perceived as more competent look-
ing, regardless of gender; district incumbents of the two strongest parties (CDU/
CSU, and SPD) are perceived as more attractive and more competent looking than 
non-incumbents, regardless of gender; and MPs are perceived as more competent 
looking than non-MPs, regardless of gender and party.
In addition to candidate characteristics and party support, our voter-level analysis 
further includes a set of controls related to the likelihood of (self-reported) exposure 
to campaign posters. For one, we adjust for potential differences in the likelihood of 
9 These data as well as information on vote share and other candidate characteristics were provided by 
the federal returning officer (Bundeswahlleiter).
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exposure due to district geography. We use (log) population density as a measure, 
since exposure to candidate posters is arguably more likely in densely populated, 
urban districts. Second, we control for voter attentiveness to politics by including 
a standard measure of political interest (5-point scale). Third, we control for voter 
sophistication by including a measure of political system knowledge. The measure 
counts the number of correct answers to two questions about the workings of the 
German electoral system. The survey did not include any other political knowledge 
items.
Lastly, our voter-level analysis controls for ways in which voters might get 
exposed to information about the candidates in their district other than through post-
ers. In particular, we control for self-reported local newspaper readership, whether 
voters report having received a leaflet from a candidate, and whether they report 
having come into direct contact with a candidate.
Results
Is there an effect of candidate appearance on electoral success?
From Table 1 we see that attractiveness has a significant effect of 0.26 percentage 
points on candidate vote share (see Table S9 in the SI for the complete regression 
results). Candidate attractiveness in our sample ranges from about 1.4 to 6 points. 
Thus, holding all else constant, we would expect the most and least attractive-look-
ing candidates to differ by about 1.2 percentage points. This is less than what previ-
ous studies have found: about 37% the size of the effects reported in Klein and Rosar 
(2005), about 50% the size of the effects reported in Rosar et al. (2008), and about 
65% the size of the effect reported in Jäckle and Metz (2017).
Facial competence is also positively associated with elections results, but the 
effect is smaller (0.2 ppts. resp. 0.78 ppts. for a min–max change in observed facial 
competence) and more uncertain, thus failing to reach statistical significance. 
Including both attractiveness and facial competence in the model reduces the effect 
of facial competence to zero, while the effect of attractiveness retains its size. The 
finding that attractiveness is a stronger predictor of electoral results than facial com-
petence is in line with findings in Berggren et al. (2010), Jäckle and Metz (2017), 
Lutz (2010), Mattes and Milazzo (2014), and Praino et al. (2014).
Does exposure to candidate posters moderate the effect of appearance?
Table 2 shows that attractiveness has a positive effect on vote choice for candidates 
that the voter reports having seen on posters; for candidates that voters have not seen 
on posters, the effect is essentially zero (see Table S10 in the SI for full results). The 
model in column 1 most closely mirrors the candidate-level model by controlling 
for candidate characteristics and party support. Column 2 adds further controls for 
the likelihood of exposure to candidate posters (i.e., population density, voter inter-
est in politics, and political knowledge). Column 3 adds controls for other ways in 
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which voters might get informed about the candidates (i.e., local newspaper reader-
ship, exposure to candidate leaflets, and direct contact with candidate). Across all 
three specifications, the effects of attractiveness remain substantively the same, and 
significantly different from zero (marginally in model 3), conditional on seeing post-
ers. In all three models the difference between the two effects of attractiveness (i.e., 
conditional on having seen posters vs. not having seen posters) is not statistically 
significant.
Apart from statistical significance, the effect sizes shown in Table  2 are also 
consistent with what we found at the candidate level. The left panel of Fig. 1 illus-
trates the effects of candidate attractiveness on the (average) probability of voting 
for a candidate, conditional on seeing posters of the candidate.10 Since the predicted 
Table 1  The effect of looks on 
candidate vote share
Robust standard errors (clustered by constituency) in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
(1) (2) (3)
Cand. attractiveness 0.26* 0.24+
(0.12) (0.13)
Cand. facial competence 0.20 0.04
(0.14) (0.16)
District incumbent 3.12*** 3.16*** 3.13***
(0.34) (0.33) (0.34)
Top leading politician 2.85** 2.87** 2.86**
(0.96) (0.95) (0.96)
MP 1.04*** 1.03*** 1.04***
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Academic title: Dr 0.45* 0.45* 0.45*
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Academic title: Prof 1.55** 1.46* 1.54**
(0.58) (0.57) (0.58)
Female cand  − 0.24  − 0.13  − 0.24
(0.18) (0.18) (0.19)
Cand. age (log) 0.66+ 0.19 0.62
(0.38) (0.41) (0.44)
Share of 2nd votes 1.03*** 1.03*** 1.03***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Further controls (not shown) Yes Yes Yes
Constituency fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Party fixed effects by region Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1010 1010 1010
Districts 208 208 208
10 Probabilities were computed using the observed value approach (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan 2013). 
Computations were performed with the “predictnl” routine of Stata 15, see the SI for details.
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relationship is almost linear, a one-unit increase in attractiveness on the 7-point 
scale is roughly associated with an increase in the average probability of voting for 
the candidate by about 0.67 percentage points (4.7 ppts. divided by 7), holding all 
other variables at their observed values. As about 40 percent of voters in our sample 
report having seen posters of the candidates, increasing attractiveness by one unit 
Table 2  Exposure to candidate posters and attractiveness’ effect on candidate choice
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
(1) (2) (3)
Seen cand. poster*Cand. attractiveness 0.17* 0.16* 0.14+
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Not seen cand. poster*Cand. attractiveness 0.02 0.03 0.03
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Seen cand. poster  − 0.23  − 0.18  − 0.12
(0.35) (0.35) (0.35)
Voter party rating 0.80*** 0.80*** 0.81***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Voter party identification 1.53*** 1.55*** 1.53***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Constants for each party by region Yes Yes Yes
Other candidate characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Likelihood of exposure to posters Yes Yes
Other potential sources of information about candidates Yes
Observations 13,641 13,623 13,613






































1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Candidate facial competence
Fig. 1  The effects of candidate attractiveness and facial competence on voters who have seen posters of 
the candidate or not. Calculations based on column 3 of Tables 2 and 3, respectively. The graphs show 
the average probability of voting for a candidate and associated 90% confidence intervals, while holding 
all other variables at their observed values
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thus translates into an estimated 0.26 (0.67 × 0.4) ppts-increase in votes, on average. 
This is the same effect size that we estimated at the candidate level.
For facial competence, we find no evidence for an effect of campaign posters. 
Across all three model specifications in Table 2 the coefficients of facial competence 
are positive and about the same size, regardless of whether voters have seen post-
ers of the candidates or not (see Table S11 in the SI for full results). The lack of 
moderation is also visible in Fig. 1, right panel. Furthermore, contrary to expecta-
tion, the effects of facial competence that reach statistical significance are those for 
candidates that voters report not having seen on posters. The difference between the 
conditional effects of facial competence is also not statistically significant in any of 
the models.11
Discussion
Our results support a story in which attractive-looking candidates enjoy a small 
bonus among voters who have seen them on campaign posters. In line with previ-
ous studies showing an attractiveness bonus at German parliamentary elections, we 
find that attractive-looking candidates enjoy an electoral advantage (Jäckle and Metz 
Table 3  Exposure to candidate posters and facial competence’s effect on candidate choice
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
(1) (2) (3)
Seen cand. poster*Cand. facial competence 0.14 0.15 0.15
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Not seen cand. poster*Cand. facial competence 0.18+ 0.18+ 0.19+
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Seen cand. poster 0.42 0.40 0.44
(0.60) (0.60) (0.61)
Voter party rating 0.80*** 0.80*** 0.80***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Voter party identification 1.53*** 1.55*** 1.53***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Constants for each party by region Yes Yes Yes
Other candidate characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Likelihood of exposure to posters Yes Yes
Other potential sources of information about candidates Yes
Observations 13,641 13,623 13,613
Respondents 2820 2816 2814
11 We also re-ran all our analyses excluding top leading politicians entirely from the sample. The results 
of these additional analyses, which are similar to the ones reported above, can be found in Tables S12 to 
S13 in the SI.
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2017; Klein and Rosar 2005; Rosar et al. 2008). At the voter level, we find tentative 
support for the hypothesis that the observed association is due to campaign posters 
of the candidates. First, the effect of candidate attractiveness is positive and (mostly) 
statistically significant for candidates that voters have seen on posters. Second, its 
size is consistent with what we observe at the candidate level. Third, we find no sig-
nificant effect of attractiveness on the choice of candidates that voters have not seen 
on posters. However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference between 
the two effects.
Our results are inconclusive regarding an effect of candidate facial competence. 
For one thing, facial competence produces only a small and statistically insignifi-
cant effect at the candidate level. While the effect is not much smaller than that of 
attractiveness, it does go to zero when attractiveness is included in the model. The 
effect of attractiveness, on the other hand, retains its size when facial competence is 
controlled for. Prior research has repeatedly documented an effect of attractiveness 
in German parliamentary elections (Jäckle and Metz 2017; Klein and Rosar 2005; 
Rosar et al. 2008). To date there is only one study showing an effect of facial com-
petence (Jäckle and Metz 2017). The effect of competence in that study turned out 
not to be robust to the inclusion of control variables—in particular district incum-
bency. At the voter level, we find facial competence to be positively associated with 
voting for a candidate, regardless of whether the candidate was seen on posters or 
not and most strongly for candidates that voters report not having seen on posters. 
This defies expectations held widely in the literature that exposure to posters trig-
gers appearance effects.
One reason for this lack of clarity could be measurement error. Ratings of facial 
competence in our study were less reliable than ratings of attractiveness. Since 
measurement error in predictor variables can lead to increased variation in estimated 
effect sizes (Loken and Gelman 2017)—especially in small to medium-sized sam-
ples—this might explain why our findings were more mixed with regard to facial 
competence (note the larger standard errors on facial competence’s effects across all 
models). Another explanation might be that U.S. raters judge facial competence dif-
ferently from Germans. However, recent studies have shown that raters from Asian 
countries generally agree with U.S. raters in their assessments of politicians’ facial 
competence and their assessments are equally predictive of those politicians’ elec-
toral success (Na et al. 2015; Rule et al. 2011). Further research will be needed to 
determine whether facial competence exerts an effect at Bundestag elections and 
if so, how. Our results at this point do not add much beyond the current state of 
research.
Conclusion
Our study is the first to test a widespread assumption that inundating voters with 
facial photographs of candidates around election time can lead to voting based on 
looks (e.g., Lawson et  al. 2010). Conditional on seeing posters, we estimate the 
effect of candidate attractiveness on the probability of voting at about 4.7 percentage 
points, for a minimum-to-maximum change in observed attractiveness. For some 
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readers this might seem too small given the ubiquity of campaign posters in Ger-
man elections and given German voters’ lack of familiarity with their local district 
candidates, both of which should make them more susceptible to candidate looks. 
One should bear in mind, though, that German elections are, first and foremost, 
fought by parties and party leaders. Most voters choose district candidates based on 
their party affiliation, not looks, a fact that is also evident from the strong effects of 
party in each of our analyses. In contexts where party allegiances are weaker, as, for 
example, in many post-communist countries or developing countries, exposure to 
candidate posters might well lead to larger appearance effects than those reported 
here—as long as voters do not have other reasons (e.g., gender or ethnicity) to vote 
for a candidate.
We also found the effects of appearance on election results to be substantially 
smaller than those reported in previous studies (Jäckle and Metz 2017; Klein and 
Rosar 2005; Rosar et al. 2008). Roughly, the effect sizes in our study are about half 
of what previous studies have found. This suggests that the effect of appearance 
might be more variable (from election to election) and perhaps also smaller, on aver-
age, than previously assumed.
Given the small effects that we found and the lack of statistical significance in 
some of the relevant comparisons, more research will be necessary to ascertain the 
role of campaign posters in moderating the effect of candidate looks on voting. If 
our current results hold up, they imply a limit on efforts to reduce the effect of looks. 
In particular they suggest that removing candidate photographs from ballot papers, 
which many previous studies identify as a major source for appearance effects (Ban-
ducci et  al. 2008; Buckley et  al. 2007; Johns and Shephard 2011; Lawson et  al. 
2010), might not help purge elections from the influence of candidate appearance 
if the candidates are allowed to fill streets with their portraits. Unless the usage of 
facial photographs in electoral advertising is severely curbed—and it is not clear that 
such a move would be desirable—the vote–looks association is likely to persist.
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